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Purpose 
This paper seeks to draw out the main themes of the debate on the current financial crisis as published 
in the special issue of CPOIB No. 1/2 (2009) and place them in the context of subsequent events. It also 
considers what conclusions can be drawn both for future policy and for the conduct of future academic 
research 
 
Design/methodology/approach 
The paper overviews existing literature and summarises the main findings, focusing particularly on 
some topics deemed important and interesting for directing future research. 
 
Findings 
The paper finds that while the neoclassical approach to finance has evidently failed there is currently 
little consensus on how to replace it.  This opens up the possibility of debate, new avenues for research 
and ultimately radical change. 
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Practical implications 
The paper argues that more interactions between academic and finance practitioners are needed. 
Research in finance should be interdisciplinary or embed the insights from other disciplines and it 
should put behavioural finance under mainstream attention. The teaching of management and finance 
should also be more informed by issues of ethics, politics, social corporate responsibility, distribution 
of wealth and power and it should stimulate more critical and creative thinking. 
 
Social implications  
The authors argue that capitalism works well only when it is adequately regulated and when there is a 
solid mechanism of balancing and counterbalancing of powers among the major players. The paper 
therefore calls for a “democratisation” of capitalism, to stop the trend of growing global inequality and 
reverse the existent plutocratic capitalism. 
 
Originality/value 
The paper outlines several viewpoints and interpretations of the financial crisis taken from the extant 
literature and hence offers a reflection on several dimensions that shaped the crisis.  
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Introduction 
 
The large and far reaching global financial crisis has naturally given rise to a wide 
variety of responses and reflections. The causes, consequences and implications have 
all been extensively debated and many authors have made recommendations as to 
future policy. The status quo in both the academic and practical approaches to 
economics and finance is rightly up for debate in a way that has not occurred for 
many decades. As one would expect, there is not complete consensus on either the 
diagnosis of the underlying problems or their solution. However, given the magnitude 
of the crisis a range of views can only be welcomed. Informed commentators have 
advocated actions ranging across a spectrum from making some modest reforms to the 
financial regulatory system to fundamentally reassessing our entire approach to 
politics, economics and ethics.  
 
The recent special issue of this journal dealing with the crisis included articles 
containing a wide spectrum of opinions and this paper initially seeks to draw out the 
main themes of the debate and then place them in the context of subsequent events 
and consider what conclusions can be drawn both for future policy and for the 
conduct of future academic research related to these issues. In the next section of the 
article we give some background to the crisis and in the subsequent sections we 
review some of the different perspectives on the crisis, consider the implications for 
academic research and finally present conclusions. 
 
 
Background 
 
It is generally accepted that the present financial meltdown, originating in the USA, 
primarily stems from excessive risk-taking in the financial system. Homeowners took 
out risky loans that were pushed by greedy loan brokers and lenders who cared little 
about the riskiness of these loans as they would be packaged and sold off as 
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)1 not allowing their buyers to know 
exactly what default risk was attached to them. So those who issued the mortgages 
(and had done the risk assessment) passed on the risks to others – mostly sophisticated 
investors like financial institutions whose eventual losses due to mortgage defaults 
created systemic risks for other participants in the financial markets. Unlike the 
1929’s crisis, this is not a liquidity crisis, but a solvency crisis due to a lack of faith in 
the ability of borrowers to repay their debts, the inability of the market to value the 
toxic assets and hence the lack of credibility of balance sheets. 
 
However a number of myths have grown up around the crisis. One myth that has to be 
demolished is that the state was a passive spectator to the events. As Aalbers (2008) 
argues, the state enabled both securitization and subprime lending. Gotham (2006) 
analyses the deregulation of the mortgage market and shows that the federal 
government, for example, through the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and 
Enforcement Act (1989), pushed portfolio lenders to securitize their loans and shift to 
off-balance lending (Aalbers, 2009, p. 94). That is, the US state was at the origins of 
                                                 
1
 Another common term used instead of RMBS is collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). 
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the current crisis.2 Part of the guilt is to be shared with many regulators whose actions 
were absent or insufficient because they were either ‘heavily understaffed or assumed 
financial markets could work most efficiently if they were to be self-regulated. More 
importantly, since the 1990s most mortgage lenders were non-banks that did not have 
to live up to banking regulations and could operate within an almost non-existent 
framework’ (Aalbers, ibidem). 
 
Additionally, there are two more interesting myths in the collective imagery of the 
credit crunch that need to be critically reassessed. The first is that subprime loans 
were taken out by highly indebted households with poor credit scores. The reality is 
that the majority of the subprime loans went to borrowers with prime credit (Brooks 
and Simon, 2007; Dymski, 2007).3 The lending was at higher fees and interest rates, 
whether or not borrowers actually had bad credit, so selling these loans was good 
business for both mortgage lenders and brokers. Lenders could charge higher interest 
rates hence make more profits. Brokers also had incentives since they were not 
responsible for problems with defaulting borrowers but they were simply paid a fee 
for what they sold. Actually, if borrowers defaulted, brokers could make even more 
money by selling them another loan, increasing the market for refinancing (Aalbers, 
2009, p. 96).  
 
The second more disconcerting myth is that subprime lending allowed people who 
were formerly excluded from homeownership, like low-income and ethnic minority 
groups, to buy a house. There is nothing further from the truth. The reality is that 
more than half of the subprime loans were refinance loans and second mortgages, 
granted to people who already owned a mortgaged property. Most of these refinance 
loans were adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs), which start with a low interest rate to 
attract customers, but which become much more expensive after two or three years. 
The trick was that borrowers were often misled about the higher interest rate which 
was detailed in the small print of an incomprehensible mortgage contract (Aalbers, 
ibidem). Shockingly, these predatory loans were sold mostly in neighbourhoods with 
ethnic minority populations. Almost half of the loans in minority areas were 
predatory, compared to 22 per cent in white areas (Avery et al., 2007). Schloemer et 
al. (2006) show how African-Americans received more than twice as many high-
priced loans as Whites, even after controlling for the risk level of the borrower. 
Consequently, foreclosures were concentrated in certain parts of the cities. 
 
One recurring theme when explaining the current financial turmoil is the increasing 
complexity of the financial system, both in terms of products and players. A large 
number of complex financial products, many of them derivatives, have been 
introduced in recent years, requiring a much larger proportion of financial industry 
employees to have advanced knowledge of financial engineering and risk 
management that was once confined to an élite of financial gurus. This complexity 
                                                 
2
 Aalbers (2009, p. 95) recalls how many US state initiatives to tighten financial regulation, like those 
from North Carolina, West Virginia or New Mexico, were halted by the federal government and that 
these states were forced to withdraw certain acts and regulations. 
3
 Only a portion of funds were being lent to subprime borrowers. These loans were called, in a 
derogatory way, “ninja loans” – “no income, job or assets”. Their existence was justified by the simple 
expectation that house prices would continue to appreciate and the lenders would recover their loans 
from the appreciation of the prices when borrowers default. The quality of these borrowers clearly did 
not matter because of such expectations (Jain, 2009, p. 104). 
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was such that many observers considered these products difficult to understand and 
not easily controllable. New players, such as hedge funds, private equity funds, 
conduits, Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs), etc. became prominent on the 
financial scene, but their actions were not transparent and subject to little or no 
regulation (Viñals, 2008, pp. 4-5). A particularly deleterious element that amplified 
the meltdown is leveraging. Many investors, such as investment banks, bought RMBS 
with borrowed money, with leverage factors averaging around 14, but not 
uncommonly reaching 20 or 30 (see Aalbers, 2009, p. 95). Under these conditions 
both profits and losses become disproportionately large. 
 
The events that occurred at the most acute stage of the crisis, after the decline in the 
US housing market, have been very well documented, not least in the special issue of 
this journal4, and so need only be briefly summarised here. The facts are that in the 
autumn of 2008, after the collapse of several of America’s largest financial 
institutions, the world’s financial system was on the verge of total systemic collapse 
with incalculable consequences for the real economy. The possibility of another Great 
Depression was certainly not hyperbole.   
 
The only possible quick way out of such an impasse was the enormous deployment of 
public funds that took place, mainly in the USA and a number of European countries 
through government loans, nationalizations and monetary policies based on 
quantitative easing.5 One of the novelties of the current crisis compared to previous 
crises is the policy coordination efforts made by such countries, as witnessed by the 
setting of the agenda for the G8 2009 in L’Aquila (Italy), the G20 London summit 
(April 2009) and the extraordinary G20 Pittsburgh summit (September 2009), the 
latter called for the purpose of tackling the global credit crisis. Such massive 
government liquidity interventions and bail-outs were determined rather quickly, as 
noticed by Caprotti (2009) and directed at stabilizing and providing legitimacy to the 
financial industry organizations before gigantic domino effects contaminated the real 
economy. In a sense such interventions could be characterised as an emergency and 
unplanned U-turn from free market to Keynesian-type policies at least partially 
inspired by memories of the policy mistakes of the 1930s (see Pressman, 2009, for an 
analysis of the crisis from a Keynesian perspective). Unfortunately at the time of 
writing some reflections on the effectiveness of such governmental interventions to 
                                                 
4
 Critical Perspectives on International Business, Volume 5, Issue 1/2. 
5
 For example, as ONS (2009) figures show, at the end of August 2009 the UK’s net debt was £804.8 
billion, equivalent to 57.5% of gross domestic product, compared to 44% and 35.9% in August 2008 
and August 2007 respectively (Northern Rock’s tumble started in September 2007). Regarding the 
quantitative easing practised by the Bank of England since March 2009 the quantity of assets (like 
government and corporate bonds) purchased by the creation of central bank reserves on a settled basis 
reached £162.175 bn on 8th October 2009. At end-June 2009, the contribution to the UK’s public sector 
net debt (PSND) from financial sector interventions amounted to £141.2bn. Northern Rock and 
Bradford & Bingley together accounted for £118bn of this difference. Compensation payments to 
depositors by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme and HM Treasury accounted for a further 
£9bn. The remainder represents the contribution to net debt from purchases by the Bank of England’s 
Asset Purchase Facility Fund. Cfr. ONS (2009, p. 5).  
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, signed into law by President Obama on 
February 17th 2009, is an unprecedented effort to jumpstart the US economy and distribute $787 
billion across several measures from saving jobs and providing tax relief to improve infrastructure, 
education, healthcare and energy independence. US public sector gross debt is projected to rise by at 
least 40% in the next five years (to over 100% of GDP from the 70% level at the time of writing in 
October 2009). Source: http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/federal_debt_chart.html 
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restore liquidity and market confidence lead us to observe that although the major 
financial players have been saved from failure and continued their operations (even 
under a changed organizational form) and bank runs or similar panics were largely 
avoided, the negative effects on the real economy are still far reaching. The wave of 
company closures on the global scene, the shrinking international trade and foreign 
direct investment and the unemployment hike hit more or less all industrialised 
countries and several emerging economies. As Wong (2009, p.58) correctly points 
out, ‘the difference with 1929 is that the world is far more interdependent and the 
scale of the crisis is potentially far bigger.’ Although official discount rates/federal 
funds rates reached their lowest historical levels, the credit spreads ─ the difference 
between what it costs the government to borrow and what private-sector borrowers 
must pay ─ are at historic highs. Banks have failed to pass on much of the cut in base 
rates, with margins between the base rate and lenders' Standard Variable Rates more 
than doubling over the last year, hence they have kept relatively high bank rates and 
restricted loans and mortgages to recover their exposures. In other words the 
transmission of monetary policy has been altered.6 Until all the bad assets are 
removed, many institutions will still lack sufficient capital to extend fresh credit to the 
economy (Wong, 2009, p. 62). This bleak scenario is accompanied by increased 
public debts and deficits, lower tax revenues, expected rises in inflation and interest 
rates and the announced austerity that will characterise most countries in the future. It 
is clear that the public spending priorities will have to change to repay these huge 
debts during the time the financial industry organizations clean up all the toxic assets 
and non-performing loans that still appear on their balance sheets. The shares 
acquired by activist States turned into shareholders will in the future be sold on the 
market and banks now nationalized will return to private hands. But in the meanwhile 
what demands are being placed on taxpayers’ pockets? What social-economic policies 
will have a budget cut to see through these difficult times? Education and research 
funding seems one.7 Caprotti (2009) discusses the missed opportunities represented 
                                                 
6
 Ibañez (2009) argues that since the introduction of the euro, innovations in credit markets in the euro 
area have had a significant impact on banks’ ability and incentives to grant credit and, more 
specifically, on the effectiveness of the bank lending channel. Two major innovations in this respect 
have been the greater reliance of banks on market sources of funding (i.e. expansion of the covered 
bond market) and a dramatic increase in securitisation activity. The recent crisis suggests that due to 
the increase in funding via financial markets, banks’ incentives and ability to lend are likely to be more 
sensitive to financial market conditions than was the case in the past when banks were overwhelmingly 
funded via bank deposits. There is significant US evidence that securitisation has led to laxer screening 
of borrowers (see Dell’Ariccia, Igan and Laeven, 2008, and Keys, Mukherjee, Seru and Vig, 2008). 
These papers assume that when securities are passed from banks’ balance sheets to the markets there 
could be fewer incentives for financial intermediaries to screen borrowers. In the short term, this 
change in incentives would contribute to looser credit standards, in the long term, this would lead to 
higher default rates on bank loans. Also, the laxer screening of borrowers seems to be linked to an 
expansion in the granting of credit (see Mian and Sufi, 2008). Moreover, there is tentative evidence that 
securitisation has detached credit supply from monetary policy changes (see Altunbas, Gambacorta and 
Marqués Ibañez, 2008) and this suggests that securitisation could make the bank lending channel less 
effective. Last, but not least, some recent research has also raised the issue of how the stance of 
monetary policy could affect the “risk tolerance” of banks which could possibly trigger a credit supply 
shock if risk taking became excessive (see Rajan, 2006). This is the “risk taking” channel of monetary 
policy transmission, which suggests that financial innovation is likely to have enhanced the importance 
of the perceptions and pricing of risk as factors influencing the behaviour of banks. This could have 
strengthened the link between the stance of monetary policy and banks’ incentives for risk taking. 
7
 For example, in the UK Universities students’ enrolment has increased across all disciplines due to 
the prospect of high youth unemployment but the increase in students numbers has not been matched 
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by ‘the ready availability of capital and resources to rescue the financial system, while 
much smaller capital and resource allocations required to help resolve or ameliorate 
lasting socioeconomic problems, especially at the domestic scale, have regularly not 
been made available, or have been voted down by political representatives concerned 
with constituency reactions (Weir et al. 1988).’  
 
Nouriel Roubini in an article entitled “The risk of a double-dip recession is rising” 
published in the Financial Times on 23 August 2009 affirms: 
[…] true deleveraging has not begun yet because the losses of financial institutions have 
been socialised and put on government balance sheets. This limits the ability of banks to 
lend, households to spend and companies to invest. […] The releveraging of the public 
sector through its build-up of large fiscal deficits risks crowding out a recovery in private 
sector spending. 
 
In other words, some painful deleveraging through bank failures should have probably 
been allowed. 
 
 
Different Perspectives on the Crisis 
 
A number of different perspectives can be taken on the crisis. Some commentators 
take a broad overview of the process. Kallis et al. (2008, p. 20) point out that ‘the 
problem was that all the actors in the process had been looking at what they thought 
was reality through trends in market signals rather than looking at the underlying 
reality.’ The bad habit that became spread among both home buyers and lenders was 
to be over-confident that housing prices would continue to go up because they had 
gone up for a long time. Was this motivated by greed as Weitzer and Darroch (2009 ) 
argue? Was it due to lack of common sense? Was it the lax regulation that blinded the 
eyes of controllers? Be that as it may we certainly need to recover that common sense 
and morality we pushed aside. It is perhaps not by chance that books such as A 
Colossal Failure of Common Sense: The Incredible Inside Story of the Collapse of 
Lehman Brothers by Larry MacDonald and Patrick Robinson have just seen the light.  
 
Jain (2009, p. 101) states that the subprime crisis of 2007-2008 is not a crisis of greed 
or excessive financial innovations, it is a crisis of hubris. Why? Because mortgage 
lenders where passing on risks so that they did not suffer in the case of borrowers’ 
default; buyers were taking on risks that they did not understand without assessing 
them; ‘rating agencies were classifying the RMBS as high quality paper even when 
they contained large shares of sub-prime mortgages’; buyers trusted completely these 
ratings; ‘regulators deluded themselves that markets were efficient in pricing risk 
even when given a free lunch’; more generally ‘regulators suffered from the investors’ 
curse of “overconfidence in their abilities” and ignored everything that the past crises 
have taught us about how individuals and markets behave’ (Jain, 2009, pp. 100-101, 
104).    
 
Other authors have tended to stress particular causal effects. For convenience we have 
adopted a number of broad themes to summarise the discussion and these are outlined 
below. One approach is to emphasise the role of regulation, the failure of which can 
                                                                                                                                            
by increased government funding due to the restriction on funding student places. Several colleges and 
universities face financial distress and have decided to make staff redundant. See www.ucu.org.uk 
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be viewed as allowing the crisis and the reform of which is necessary for a 
satisfactory financial system in the future. Some authors emphasise the disjoint 
between the financial and the real economy which is bound to lead to drastic periods 
of readjustment as we have so recently witnessed. Another approach is to consider the 
nature of the interactions between institutions involved in the financial system.  
Finally the relationship between politics, economics and the financial system over the 
last few decades, and in particular the dominance of the neoclassical economics 
paradigm, is seen by a number of authorities to be at the root of the crisis. 
 
 
Regulation 
 
Given that one of the fundamental aims of financial regulation is to prevent the danger 
of a systemic collapse it is almost a truism to argue the prevailing regulatory system 
has failed. An obvious and necessary response to the crisis is to make appropriate 
reforms to the regulatory system and huge efforts are going into this area (see, for 
example, Turner, 2009, for a wide ranging overview from the Financial Services 
Authority, the main UK regulatory body or a recent special issue of the Journal of 
Financial Regulation and Compliance8 for a range of academic viewpoints).  
 
Interestingly, although the precondition to avoid the recurrence of another crisis 
would be to introduce more stringent regulation, not everybody agrees with its long-
term effectiveness. Wong (2009, p. 67) argues that ‘the (re)regulation of the finance 
sector and governmental interventions in the sector do not constitute a radical 
change’. He quotes Moran (1991, p. 13) who notices that there is long history of 
popular protest and discontent triggered by financial scandals and crises in the USA 
and that far from undermining the institutional and regulatory basis of financial 
expansion, have repeatedly been “pacified” through the process of further 
“codification, institutionalisation and juridification”. The underlying idea is that 
capitalism has an anarchic nature, and as such it cannot be controlled by governments 
and central bankers (Wong, ibidem). This anarchism is compounded by the 
unprecedented concentration of capital, mostly fictitious, and the possibility of 
moving it around the world – still quoting Wong – ‘at the caprice of a small number 
of people’, making the capitalism ‘more convulsive and unpredictable’. Our 
capitalism is thus more prone to recurrent crises because ‘a particular dynamic of 
growth, marked by intensified financialization, is generating new contradictions and 
new barriers to sustained accumulation (Wong, 2009, p. 68). 
  
 
Disjoint between the financial and the real economy 
 
A major point of departure from conventional economic thinking is lucidly explained 
in the article “Paper Assets, Real Debts: An Ecological-Economic Exploration of the 
Global Economic Crisis” by Kallis et al. (2009) These ecological economists take the 
view that the crisis is only a manifestation of a ‘growing disjuncture between the real 
economy of production and the paper economy of finance’. They challenge the notion 
of growth-as-progress given that ecological and resource factors are constrained. The 
very nature of the financial system is to allow inter-temporal transfer of funds, or to 
                                                 
8
 Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, vol. 17, no. 4, 2009. 
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borrow against the future, on the expectation that future economic growth will 
provide the means to repay the interest and principal. But what if this economic 
growth cannot be sustained indefinitely? The real economy of production that lies 
beneath the financial sphere is the one that matters to create wealth and avoid debt 
default. But, in turn, this real economy relies on the availability of resources and 
energy whose growth depends only partially on economic factors like prices and 
markets, having physical and biological limits too. Depletion of stock resources like 
fossil fuels, the degradation of the global atmosphere and the shrinking space on Earth 
available to receive our waste may seriously condition future human activity and its 
economic returns. Also, such bio-physical constraints can become binding in a fast 
and irreversible manner, not allowing an effective correction once the thresholds have 
been surpassed.  
 
So the argument put forward by these authors is simple: the finance sphere grew far 
too fast and too large to be supported by the real economy beneath. This is not a new 
argument. As cited by Kallis et al. (2009), Soddy (1926) noticed that the financial 
system can be prone to increase debts (both private and public) and then mistake the 
expansion of credit for the creation of real wealth. Brenner (2006) showed how asset 
bubbles – first technology shares and then houses – contributed to maintaining the 
perception of a buoyant economy and consumption growth, but only at the cost of 
building up personal and corporate indebtedness.9 The amount of speculation which 
has been growing exponentially in recent years helps to drive a wedge between 
finance and the underlying real economy. As Wong (2009, p. 64) reports, for every 
dollar that crosses the exchanges for trade, sixty go for pure speculation. According to 
Augar (2006) speculative capital movements, swaps, forwards and options now 
overwhelm trade in their importance for the balance of payments. Financial sector 
profits as a percentage of total US corporate profits rose at a staggering rate from 14 
percent in 1981 to 40 percent in 2003; and at the end of 2008 they were still at 27.6 
per cent notwithstanding the financial turmoil.10  
 
This problem is made worse by the incorrect calculation of economic growth by 
standard accounting measures like GDP, where negative externalities like pollution 
are not accounted for. Then we can form the false impression that we can fulfil the 
obligation to repay the accumulated financial debts at compound interest because we 
use an inflated measure of economic growth since pollution is not valued and 
exhaustible resources are undervalued. In other words, if we would have been able to 
correctly measure our real growth we could have avoided such excessive growth of 
financial assets relative to the growth of real wealth. Banks suddenly had to close the 
credit taps and rightly so; we had too much liquidity, not too little, and the bubble 
burst. Also Wong (2009, p. 61) agrees that ‘the present crisis is not one arising from a 
lack of money; on the contrary, it is the crisis that causes a lack of money. When the 
economy enters into crisis, credit dries up and people demand hard cash instead.’ The 
problem is that the effect of the crisis becomes its cause as well, creating a downward 
                                                 
9
 See Wong (2009, p. 73). The expanded number of mortgagees despite increasing house prices 
occurred with loan-to-house-values up to 100 percent and this could only be sustainable as long as 
house prices continued to rise and interest rates remained low. Heavy borrowings were used to buy up 
financial assets, not based on the income streams they would generate, but merely on the assumption of 
increasing prices for these assets (Wong, ibidem). 
10
 Authors’ own calculations based on BEA data for domestic corporate profits with inventory 
valuation and capital consumption adjustments. 
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spiral. That is why State intervention has been judged crucial by policymakers in 
trying to break this spiral, and market discipline, i.e. leaving corporations to go 
bankrupt, in nearly all instances was not an option because of the very nature of the 
financial industry. Whether public instead of private deleveraging will be conducive 
to more sustained growth remains however a debatable issue. 
 
Another aspect not highlighted enough in our view is that high oil prices are among 
the culprits of the current economic crisis.11 These were not caused by the OPEC 
oligopoly, since the cartel members were producing close to full capacity from 2002 
and particularly in 2007-08 even as prices shot up.12 Such an oil price hike then must 
be attributed more to oil market speculation. And here two explanations are given. 
First, as Kallis et al. (2009) point out, we are approaching peak-oil and market 
expectations incorporated this. Second, as Khan (2009) explains, the phenomenal 
increase in financialisation of commodity markets during 2006–08, including in 
particular the oil market, led to speculation and momentum trading,13 which pushed 
oil prices way beyond their long-term equilibrium level as determined by 
fundamentals. Speculation on the future price of oil led to both overshooting of spot 
prices in the first half of 2008 and undershooting in the second half of the year. 
Speculation can be gauged by the data on the volume of oil futures, which shows a 
spectacular growth over the last few years. In 2002 the average daily trading volume 
of oil futures (also known as paper barrels) was four times the daily world demand for 
oil (physical barrels). By 2008, daily trading in paper barrels had reached 15 times the 
daily world production of oil (of around 85 million barrels per day) and remained at 
about that level through the first half of 2009.14 The importance of speculation in oil 
price futures is recognised by the fact that the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) is considering whether to impose speculative limits on futures 
contracts for energy products as it already does for agricultural products like wheat 
and corn. In an article in the Wall Street Journal on July 8, 2009, UK Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown and the French President Nicolas Sarkozy also expressed concern 
about “damaging speculation” and called for the International Organization of 
Securities Regulators to oversee the oil futures market and investigate the role that 
futures trading plays in oil price fluctuations. If, as claimed by Khan (2009), 
speculation played a significant role in the 2008 bubble, then it is correct to invoke 
more controls to prevent the emergence of another bubble in the future. The policies 
being considered by the CFTC (2009) to put aggregate position limits on futures 
contracts and to increase the transparency of futures markets are moves in the right 
direction.  Apart from the speculation argument, oil capacity expansion has slowed in 
2009 (see OPEC, 2009), at the same time the International Energy Agency (IEA) 
forecasts world demand for oil to rise by about 0.6 percent a year from 2010 on, 
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 Hamilton (2009) offers an economic explanation of why oil prices are important in understanding the 
crisis. Basically higher oil and gasoline prices damaged the U.S. auto industry, the effects of which 
cascaded through large swathes of the rest of the economy and helped curtail spending. Energy prices 
also cut consumers’ disposable income and confidence. Cheap abodes in distant US suburbs lost value 
following oil price hikes, so much that the housing meltdown too can be partially attributed to higher 
oil prices. 
12
 See Khan (2009). 
13
 Momentum trading is essentially buying commodities that have experienced high returns during 
some recent period and selling (or shorting) those that have had low returns. 
14
 As Khan (2009) argues, the futures data are probably an underestimate since they do not include 
options or over-the-counter trades. Furthermore, major oil producers, like Saudi Arabia and the other 
OPEC countries, transact only in the spot market and not in the futures market. 
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reaching 89 million barrels per day by 2014 (see IEA, 2009). Given the still limited 
development of alternative sources of energy, demand for oil will remain strong in the 
next few years. If oil supply does not keep up and provide the additional 3 million 
barrels per day needed by 2014, a serious imbalance between future demand and 
supply in the world oil market will emerge. Hence the plan by Prime Minister Brown 
and President Sarkozy, involving both capacity expansion and conservation or fuel 
economy, represents the only way to correct this potential imbalance. Failing these, 
and if there is no brake to speculation, a repetition of 2008 bubble could easily occur 
with spot oil prices soaring above their long-term equilibrium level and other bubbles 
could become highly likely. 
 
 
Institutional Theory 
 
Another important contribution to interpret the current financial crisis and why it 
developed is offered by Riaz (2009) using the concepts developed by the new 
institutional theory as put forward by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Meyer and 
Rowan (1977). According to this author the fundamentals of such a crisis stem from 
‘an institutional crisis, resulting from the interplay of the financial industry 
organizations and broader formal and informal institutions’ (Riaz, 2009, p. 27). The 
main idea is that there exists a reciprocal influence between investment banks and 
financial services organizations on one side, and, on the other side, the formal and 
informal institutions shaping the regulative, normative and cultural context in which 
financial industry organizations operate. So, the traditional idea that institutions 
influence organizations, but not the other way round, has to be abandoned in favour of 
a more realistic picture: financial industry organizations represent powerful interests 
that have a bearing on the survival of the institutional framework itself through active 
support and sanctions. In part due to the wave of mergers and acquisitions that the 
banking sector underwent in recent years and the globalisation which saw these 
M&As becoming cross-borders, multinational organizations now have ‘budgets far 
exceeding those of several countries put together’, as Riaz (2009, p. 28) remarks, and 
exercise their influence, lobbying, persuasion and manipulation ability to their 
advantage with regards to the institutions. The legitimacy that institutions bestow 
upon organizations in reality is mirrored by a “reverse legitimacy” created by the 
success of organizations, which then benefits the institutions, allowing their 
continuation and survival, because they are deemed to have a role in the success of 
such organizations. In other words the success of certain big organizations in the 
financial industry can cause the institutions responsible for sanctioning them to also 
become recognized as successful for having created the right regulative, normative 
and cultural environment for that success to thrive, even when the success is driven by 
other factors beyond the reach of institutional control. Such was the case for the 
mortgage-backed securities that proliferated thanks to the success of the organizations 
which managed their creation, securitization, insurance and rating. This success 
reverse legitimated the formal regulatory institutions (the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, and the Federal Reserve with its credit expansion and inflationary 
policies) and sanctioned the informal cultural-cognitive and normative institutions 
like the cultural acceptance of high debt and excessive home mortgage. 
 
One unintended consequence that arises, though, is that developing countries often 
imitate institutions from more developed countries where powerful business and 
 12
financial organizations have succeeded, and try and attract these organizations to their 
country hoping that they will replicate the same success in their host institutional 
environment. This gives rise to what Riaz (2009) calls ‘contagion of legitimacy’. For 
example, countries whose institutional environment historically encouraged savings 
saw a cultural shift and a move towards acceptance of debt and a softening of 
regulation to allow financial organizations to replicate businesses similar to those 
successful in the U.S. and Western Europe. There has been therefore an institutional 
formation in emerging economies through attempts at replication of the “successful” 
institutions where such institutions were non existent. This obviously poses on 
developed countries the big responsibility of setting the right example for developing 
countries. 
 
But the new institutional theory – as outlined by Riaz (2009) – offers probably even 
more insight into the unfolding crisis when it explains the tactics used by 
organizations to manipulate the legitimacy-granting process through strategies of 
decoupling to avoid institutional pressures not in line with parts of their structure 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Organizations may pay lip service to the institutional 
pressures and requests of conformity through the organization’s institutional layer, 
offering symbolic conformance, while implementing a substantive non-conformance 
in technical aspects using strategies of concealment or buffering (Olivier, 1991; 
Olivier, 1996).15 Such strategies of decoupling or concealment by powerful and 
successful organizations, when prolonged over a period of time, eventually have a 
negative impact on the survival of the institutions involved. The ability to comply 
only symbolically and non substantially gives a competitive advantage to the first few 
organizations which implement such strategies, since they can still derive legitimacy 
from the institutions but keep the flexibility in technical or substantive aspects to 
better their performance. If such strategies are understood or discovered by other 
organizations, then the industry becomes populated by more and more organizations 
which mimic such strategies, especially if they were first implemented by the more 
powerful and successful organizations, which consolidated their positions thanks also 
to such behaviour. But this situation can get even worse when powerful organizations 
succeed in manipulating the concerned institutions in order to make it easier to 
implement such concealment and decoupling strategies. This is achieved when 
institutions are weakened in their ability to detect the substantive non-conformity of 
organizations and their “illegitimate” substantive structures, nonetheless projecting a 
heightened perception of legitimacy to the outside world. And this clears the way for 
a legitimacy crisis once the illegitimate structures become prevalent in the 
organizational field. Like a bubble ready to burst, when the illegitimacy of a few 
organizations, particularly the more successful ones, becomes well-known outside the 
field, a domino effect occurs whereby the legitimacy of all organizations (even those 
                                                 
15
 For example Wong (2009, p. 64) recalls how since the 1990s banks have been creating “structured 
investment vehicles” (SIV) and other derivative assets to bypass the reserve requirement of the Basel 
Bank regulations. SIV were institutions used by banks to transfer their RMBS off balance sheets. To 
this we can add the blurring of the lines between commercial and investment banking, insurance and 
real estate which led to financial innovative packages enabling high leveraging of funds accessible 
through low interest loans. Tett and Davies (2007) called this “shadow” banking system ‘the plethora 
of opaque institutions and vehicles [that] have sprung up in American and European markets this 
decade, and […] have come to play an important role in providing credit across the system.’ This 
“hidden” system expanded rapidly in the 1990s and 2000s as a consequence of deregulation, which 
allowed many financial institutions to take on banking functions and loosened the rules that govern 
borrowing and lending (Wong, ibidem). 
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who fully complied in all aspects) goes under scrutiny. At this point the institutions 
which bestowed legitimacy to organizations with illegitimate structures suffer from a 
dramatic attack to their legitimacy-granting powers. Riaz (2009) gives the example of 
the investment banks in the USA, which needed to avoid institutional pressures that 
were in conflict with substantive aspects of the banks’ operations related to subprime 
mortgage risks, yet also needed to be considered legitimate for the nature of their 
business. Hence ‘they remained exposed to the high risk of subprime mortgages in 
substantive terms, while maintaining legitimacy in symbolic aspects.’ But ‘once the 
discovery of illegitimate structures within powerful and successful investment banks 
became public knowledge outside their field, the legitimacy of all investment banks 
along the relevant dimensions became suspect.’ (Riaz, 2009, p. 32). The reaction of 
the most prominent investment banks was to change organizational form to escape the 
legitimacy crisis.16 Other financial organizations had to be saved through 
nationalization or government loans. 
 
The collateral effect however was that the collapse of the “contagion of legitimacy” 
invested both the formal institutions (like the Federal Reserve and its credit expansion 
and inflationary policies, the U.S. Treasury, the SEC) and the informal institutions, 
with scepticism rising regarding their legitimacy granting powers and the lack of an 
early warning system. High criticism and popular indignation spread and many 
debates ensued regarding the responsibility of aggressive high-risk investment 
strategies, over-leveraged banks, inefficient risk management regimes, and the 
practice of paying huge bonus rewards to executives and traders who lent themselves 
to such greedy policies in search of ever more profits for their companies. 
 
 
Financial services and politics 
 
Since the early 1980s, there has been a decoupling between the financial services 
industry and politics. Deregulation and privatisation, in the neoliberal spirit, became 
dominant economic paradigms (Caprotti, 2009) with, in some cases, ultimately 
catastrophic results as in the disastrous demutualisations of the UK building societies 
(see Klimecki and Willmott, 2009). But this crisis has restored the links between 
political power and finance, now extended at supranational level (evident, for 
example, in the banking industry disputes between Iceland and the UK) which 
underlines how globalisation of financial markets pushes the boundaries of the 
organizational-institutional interplay described by Riaz (2009) to a cross-border 
dimension where domestic and international politics have a say in the financial world. 
Also, Caprotti (2009, p. 82) notes ‘the calls for the use of public funds were both 
naturalised and prescriptive.’ The communication between industry and government 
led to the assumption that public bail-outs were the only rational solution possible and 
consequently it was natural that governments would provide public funds, 
legitimising the financial industry’s claims to citizens’ fiscal contributions. Such rapid 
response of governments and deployment of public funds is unprecedented. More 
long-standing domestic and international social, political and medical issues (like 
public health funding in the USA, a more serious commitment to fight global 
                                                 
16
 For example, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley changed organizational form to cease being 
specialized investment banks and became deposit holding banks. Bear Sterns and Merrill Lynch, which 
used to be highly specialized investment banks, in effect changed organizational form when acquired 
by universal banks JPMorgan and Bank of America respectively (Riaz, 2009, p. 32).  
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warming or to sustain public education, malaria research, or return-oriented funding 
of micro-enterprises in developing countries) have never received a parallel political 
attention, let alone cash injections of comparable scale. As Caprotti (2009) argues, 
this should show the way forward in terms of communication and political 
engagement to socio-economic advocates, business leaders, non-state actors with 
social objectives and NGOs looking for funds which politicians often refuse or limit 
on the grounds that such funds are unavailable, while this is clearly not the case.  
 
The crisis will undoubtedly have major geopolitical consequences. A key question is 
the extent to which it will bring US hegemony under challenge. The origins of the 
credit crunch in the USA has left the superpower economically weakened and 
accelerated some already powerful adverse trends. The huge current account deficits 
that it has built up in recent years (debt mostly with Japan and China) has weakened 
the dollar, so much that the euro could replace it as the international reserve and 
transaction currency (and to some extent it already has).17 After all the USA is a 
victim of that high-debt culture and disregard for savings that led to the crisis. A 
current account deficit that is not periodically reversed means that the country is 
living beyond its means. This has been possible so far to the extent to which the dollar 
was accepted for transactions on the global markets and held in the vaults of central 
banks. However no clear alternative to the US hegemony is immediately in sight. 
China is growing fast but yet not ready. The EU has always been an economic giant 
but a political dwarf. Only time will tell whether the Treaty of Lisbon, after the Irish 
referendum cleared the way to its EU-wide adoption, makes a difference in this sense. 
Another open question is the ultimate effect of the crisis on the UK. One of the key 
reasons for preserving monetary independence has been to protect the competitive 
advantage of the City. Now that the UK financial services industry has been so 
severely hit it may be that eventually public and political attitudes towards the Euro 
will alter.    
 
In broad terms, the large emerging markets (like the BRICS countries) appear to have 
escaped the worst effects of the financial crisis (see Azevedo and Terra, 2009, for a 
discussion of the Brazilian experience). In the current context of globalisation and the 
increasing level of interdependencies present in production and consumption the 
relative resilience of these economies has been very positive for global growth and 
Western countries. However, one of the main predicaments of development 
economics is that growth has to occur with redistribution. If such developing 
countries experience increasing income inequality then growth cannot be sustainable 
because, as Daly (2008) observes, this will ‘prevent most people from buying much of 
the new stuff – except on credit’. 
                                                 
17
 At the time of writing dollars accounted for about 62 percent of the currency reserve at central banks 
around the world, the lowest on record according to the International Monetary Fund. According to 
Barclays Capital over the period July-September 2009 central banks put 63 percent of their new cash 
into euro and yen, a nearly complete reversal of the dollar's onetime dominance for reserves. The 
dollar's share of new cash in the central banks was down to 37 percent compared with two-thirds a 
decade ago (see Paul Tharp “Dollar loses reserve status to yen & euro”, New York Post, 13 October 
2009 accessible at  
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/business/dollar_loses_reserve_status_to_yen_hFyfwvpBW1YYLykSJ
wTTEL). 
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Implications for Academic Research 
 
The crisis has enormous implications for academic research in business related 
disciplines. Wong (2009) invokes greater regulation of market behaviour, business 
practices and boardroom pay, and at the same time calls for a reform of the business 
educational agenda. Harney (2008) points the finger at the inadequacy of management 
and business education, particularly its neglect of social and political questions. The 
teaching of business ethics and corporate social responsibility are still marginal or non 
existent in the curricula of undergraduate and postgraduate students. Research 
published in the leading journals of business, management, accounting and finance 
rarely analyses the relationship between business practices and the distribution of 
wealth in society (Harney et al., 2008). Ferguson (2008) recalls the Marxist 
interpretation of capitalism as a ‘history of expropriation and concentration of wealth 
─ the means of production ─ in the hands of an ever-decreasing minority […], 
making capitalism crisis-prone’. Wong (2009, p.58) reaches the strong conclusion that 
‘unless fundamental reforms are introduced, including an injection of politics within 
business education and our practices, the crisis will recur again in the future.’ Echoing 
Doria et al. (2003) we invoke a teaching that stimulates more critical and creative 
thinking on a regular basis. 
 
In the field of academic finance the dominant paradigm has been drawn from 
neoclassical economics and so mainstream research has been very congruent with and 
indeed provided intellectual justification for the general move towards free-markets 
and deregulation in the finance area over the last three decades. The general 
presumption has been that atomistic, informed individuals operating in their own self 
interest in a free market will lead to prices being formed in a rational and efficient 
manner. In this view of the world free markets, almost by definition, should be self 
regulating. As stated by Keasey and Hudson (2007, p. 947) ‘Within this domain the 
activities/interactions of individual investors, institutional investors, financial 
intermediaries, companies and the market itself are rarely explored in any detail’. This 
list of under-researched topics actually forms a very good starting point for 
investigating the roots of the current crisis. As discussed above, the motivations, 
knowledge and rationality of individual borrowers, financial intermediaries, banks, 
regulators and stockholders and how these shaped their interactions were instrumental 
in creating the crisis.  
 
Basically academic finance has to become much more open to different research 
agendas and to move its focus away from the study of interactions between rational 
individuals in idealised free markets. In this respect areas that show particular promise 
include the insights available from behavioural finance and the active incorporation of 
wider approaches from economics and from other academic disciplines. 
 
Since the early 1980s there has been a steady growth of interest in behavioural 
finance, which focuses on departures from rationality and aims to bridge the gap 
between finance and psychology (see De Bondt et al, 2008 for a recent review of the 
field). However, acceptance of the area has been slow with many in the academic 
finance establishment being very unsympathetic to the approach (see, for example, 
Fama, 1998 for an influential critique). Consequently behavioural finance remains a 
somewhat marginal topic receiving, for example, little coverage in standard finance 
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textbooks. The area does, however, hold a great deal of future promise and certainly 
offers much needed alternative research approaches. Its emphasis on the role of 
biases, mental frames and judgemental heuristics in the financial decision making of 
individuals necessitates a positive methodology which looks at how decisions are 
actually made. This stands in stark contrast to the normative approach associated with 
the neoclassical paradigm which deduces which decisions logically should be made 
given an appropriate set of starting axioms. These differences in philosophy and 
methodology produce hugely different outlooks on the financial system. One 
particularly pertinent example would be in regard to the possible existence of 
irrational bubbles in asset prices such as are often claimed to have occurred in the 
housing markets on both sides of the Atlantic in recent years. The possibility of such 
bubbles sits perfectly easily within the behavioural finance paradigm and, of course, is 
in accord with the conclusions of most non-academic observers. In stark contrast, 
many adherents of neoclassical finance struggle with the concept that asset prices 
could ever be set in a largely irrational way. Overall, given the huge stakes involved 
and the uncertainty governing the underlying processes, basic prudence would 
indicate that policymakers should consider the implications of a variety of possible 
paradigms regarding market behaviour. 
 
Academic finance can also benefit from many other important and relevant research 
insights from the areas of economics that are less wedded to the neoclassical 
paradigm, good examples of these are provided in the discussion of the benefits of 
evolutionary and complex systems approaches compared to neoclassical modelling by 
Allen and Snyder (2009) and the Kindleberger-Aliber-Minsky paradigm by Rapp 
(2009). In addition, the seminal work on asymmetric information by Akerlof, Spence 
and Stiglitz18 and the more recent work on information suppression in competitive 
markets by Gaibaux and Laibson (2006) could have produced invaluable insights into 
the roots of the current crisis in the ultimately dysfunctional interactions between the 
various parties in the mortgage supply chain. The interactions between mortgage 
borrowers, financial intermediaries, banks and credit agencies seem to have been 
characterised by perverse incentives, suppression of information and exploitation of 
the less informed at numerous levels. Much of this problematic behaviour could have 
been anticipated by detailed investigations of the interactions at a micro level. In this 
area the assumption that free markets will be self-regulating appears to have been not 
only misplaced but flying in the face of a large body of extremely rigorous and 
grounded economic theory.  
 
As the transmission mechanism of monetary policy has been altered, more research is 
needed in banking and monetary economics to understand whether and to what extent 
securitisation has made credit supply insensitive to monetary policy changes. In this 
light, an interesting topic of research suggested by Ibañez (2009, p. 4) would be to 
analyse what impact a crisis of confidence in securitisation markets has on the bank 
lending channel effectiveness. The link between the stance of monetary policy and 
banks’ incentives for risk taking should also be investigated more extensively in the 
aftermath of the credit crisis. In this light more evidence has to be gathered as to 
whether an expansive monetary policy stance may lead to additional (and probably 
                                                 
18
 A good introduction to this area and a large number of key references is given in the Nobel Prize 
acceptance speech of Stiglitz http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2001/stiglitz-
lecture.pdf 
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excessive) risk taking by banks, supporting the idea of the existence of an additional 
“behavioural” channel for the transmission of monetary policy. 
 
Moving beyond economics there are numerous opportunities for finance to draw on 
work from other disciplines, for example, the institutional theory approach discussed 
above, politics, sociology, business and management. The acceptance of research 
drawn from the management tradition has particular promise as one of the 
characteristics of academic research in finance to date has been a steadfast reluctance 
to interact with practitioners (see Keasey and Hudson, 2007). Given the almost total 
failure to anticipate the crisis within the academic community insights gained from 
such interactions can surely only be valuable. 
 
An important strand of research that will have to be developed is assessing the impact 
that this crisis has had on the strategy, financing and investment decisions of 
international businesses. In the last couple of decades we have witnessed an 
unprecedented upsurge of cross-borders mergers and acquisition driven by capital 
market inflation “which made buying companies for resale at a higher price in an 
inflating market a profitable business proposition (see Toporowski, 2009, p. 164). The 
large fall in stock markets across the world has made it more difficult to make money 
from restructuring international business’ balance sheets. It remains to be seen 
whether “the resulting inability to raise finance simultaneously in a number of 
countries will act as an informal capital control” as Toporowski (2009, p. 164) argues. 
We should certainly observe more mergers and acquisition driven by the prospect of 
improving the financial results of the resulting combined companies, rather than that 
of reaping benefits from financial asset inflation despite no substantial improvement 
in real results. Hence “the crisis provides an unrivalled opportunity to uncover the true 
constraints that determine the character and dynamics of cross-border capitalism” (see 
Toporowski, ibidem). 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
At the time of writing it appears that the world financial system has been pulled back 
from total collapse by government intervention on a huge scale. In the third quarter of 
2009 US economic growth resumed after the longest period of contraction since the 
Second World War.  In the teeth of the crisis urgent ad-hoc measures of a broadly 
Keynesian nature have been rapidly implemented. Seemingly some lessons have been 
learnt from the 1930s and a prospective depression seems to have been averted 
although very severe economic problems have proved unavoidable. 
 
The neoclassical paradigm, as actually implemented, has been seen to have failed in 
practice but there currently seems little consensus on how to replace it, which opens 
up the possibility of debate and ultimately radical change. According to Kallis et al. 
(2009) the current crisis provides an opportunity that we should not miss: it is time to 
promote alternative socio-economic paradigms such as de-growth and environmental 
justice since the current rate of fossil fuel-driven growth may be unsustainable. This 
crisis should prompt us to reappraise our relationship with money and debt, and to 
rethink about what type of capitalism we want: hopefully a fairer and more inclusive 
version of capitalism, one that does not rely on self regulation and where pure laissez 
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faire is forgotten.19 Capitalism works well only when it is adequately regulated and, 
personally we believe, when there is a solid mechanism of balancing and 
counterbalancing of powers among the major players. We dare to call it a “democratic 
capitalism”, not a plutocratic one. 
  
Counterbalancing such idealistic sentiments many powerful groups will hope for a 
swift return to the pre-crisis orthodoxy. A system which allows favoured individuals 
to become very wealthy without taking any commensurate risks and which allows 
profits to be private whereas losses are nationalised is bound to have its supporters. 
Nonetheless the idea that an unregulated, global, financial market is the ideal to which 
policymakers should aspire has been given a huge, perhaps terminal, setback as 
indeed has the idea that financial innovation and growth in the financial services 
industry is necessarily a good thing. A sign of the new mood is the possibility of 
limits on speculation in the oil markets which would be anathema to advocates of 
totally free markets. 
 
Finally we can see that the crisis demands a major reappraisal of academic research 
programmes in finance to incorporate much more seriously a wider range of ideas 
from other perspectives and disciplines and to also give priority to serious interaction 
with practitioners.   
 
 
 
                                                 
19
 As Jain (2009, p. 100) clearly explains ‘self regulation […] does not work when risks and rewards 
associated with one’s behaviour are distributed asymmetrically. Regulation becomes necessary when 
those who benefit from risky behaviour either do not bear the full costs of that risky behaviour or have 
a subjective discount rate for the distant costs that is higher than that of the society which may have to 
bear those costs. […] Regulation becomes necessary only if some of the consequences of bad decisions 
are externalized to third parties and lead to the creation of systemic risks for the financial markets and 
other participants.’ 
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